The action, announced by the FCA, brings total recoveries for WealthTek clients to more than £57m across three separate enforcement cases concluded in just over a year. The regulator targeted CACEIS UK, Sapia Partners, and Barclays Bank UK for distinct failures in their dealings with WealthTek, the trading name of Vertus Asset Management LLP.
WealthTek's former principal partner, John Dance, has been charged with multiple criminal offences including fraud and money laundering, according to the FCA. A trial is scheduled for September 2027 at Southwark Crown Court. The FCA ordered WealthTek to cease operations and appointed Special Administrators in April 2023.
What CACEIS UK failed to do, and why it matters
CACEIS UK became WealthTek's sub-custodian in November 2020, following the merger of CACEIS Bank S.A. with KAS Bank N.V. Its role was straightforward: safeguard client assets held through WealthTek.
According to the FCA's Final Notice, CACEIS UK checked the Financial Services Register on three separate occasions and found that WealthTek was not authorised to hold certain client assets. The firm also failed to identify that WealthTek was not permitted to hold client money. Despite these findings, CACEIS UK opened client accounts for WealthTek to use.
The failures did not stop at onboarding. CACEIS UK did not monitor those accounts properly, failing to promptly review and resolve alerts raised by its own systems, according to the FCA.
The sequence is notable. This was not a case of missing information. CACEIS UK's own due diligence surfaced the relevant facts. The breakdown was in acting on them.
"Strong financial crime controls keep clients' assets safe. CACEIS UK's failures exposed clients to serious risk," said Therese Chambers, joint executive director of enforcement and market oversight at the FCA.
For any firm providing sub-custody or outsourced safeguarding services, the message from the regulator is direct: collecting due diligence information without responding to what it reveals offers no defence.
The £57m recovery: how the FCA pieced together three enforcement actions
The CACEIS UK case is the largest single recovery, but it sits alongside two other actions arising from WealthTek's collapse.
Barclays Bank UK was fined £3.1m for poor handling of financial crime risks connected to a client money account opened by WealthTek, according to the FCA. Barclays also agreed to a voluntary payment of £6.3m for distribution to WealthTek clients with a shortfall in recoverable funds.
Sapia Partners LLP was censured and agreed to a voluntary payment of £19.6m for WealthTek clients, again relating to failures around client asset safeguarding.
Taken together, the three cases produced over £57m in recoveries and penalties. The FCA completed its investigation into CACEIS UK in 13 months, a pace the regulator highlighted as evidence of its efforts to accelerate enforcement.
The pattern across all three cases is consistent. Each firm had a role in the custody or banking chain around WealthTek. Each failed, in different ways, to act on financial crime risks. The FCA pursued each one individually, tailoring its enforcement response to the nature and degree of cooperation offered.
Cooperation as strategy: why CACEIS UK paid more to avoid a fine
The arithmetic of the CACEIS UK settlement deserves attention from compliance teams and boards.
Had the FCA imposed a financial penalty, the fine would have been £23.1m after a 30% settlement discount, according to the FCA's Final Notice. Instead, CACEIS UK cooperated extensively and agreed to a voluntary ex-gratia payment of £31,714,068 for the benefit of WealthTek's clients. In return, the FCA chose to censure the firm rather than impose a penalty.
Of that £31.7m, WealthTek's administrators will receive £30.9m. The Financial Services Compensation Scheme will receive £800,000, in line with its statutory duty to pursue recoveries where reasonably possible and cost effective, according to the FCA.
The distinction matters. A fine is paid to the regulator. A voluntary payment goes to affected clients. For CACEIS UK, paying £8.6m more than the alternative fine bought a censure rather than a penalty on its regulatory record, and directed the funds towards client restitution.
Whether this model becomes a template for future enforcement actions remains to be seen. But it signals that the FCA is willing to structure outcomes that prioritise client recovery over Treasury receipts, provided firms cooperate fully.
What operators who outsource custody should do now
The WealthTek saga carries practical implications for SME wealth managers, discretionary fund managers, and asset managers who rely on third-party custodians or sub-custodians.
Scrutinise the custodian's own controls
The CACEIS UK case demonstrates that a sub-custodian's failure to act on its own due diligence can leave end clients exposed. Firms appointing custodians should ask pointed questions about how the custodian escalates and resolves adverse findings during onboarding and ongoing monitoring. A due diligence process that surfaces red flags but lacks an escalation framework is, as this case shows, insufficient.
Understand the contractual chain
Where assets pass through multiple entities, each link in the chain carries operational and regulatory risk. Boards should map the full custody chain and understand which entity holds legal responsibility at each stage. The WealthTek cases involved a sub-custodian, a banking provider, and an outsourced compliance firm, each with distinct obligations and each found wanting.
Factor in enforcement pace
The FCA completed the CACEIS UK investigation in 13 months. The regulator has repeatedly signalled its intention to move faster. For firms in the custody chain, this compresses the window between a failure occurring and regulatory consequences arriving. Boards should treat the speed of recent enforcement as a standing agenda item when reviewing outsourced arrangements.
Review alert-handling processes
One of the specific criticisms of CACEIS UK was its failure to promptly review and resolve alerts generated by its own monitoring systems. Any firm providing custody or safeguarding services should audit its alert-handling workflows, ensuring that system-generated flags are triaged, escalated, and resolved within defined timeframes.
The broader lesson from the WealthTek enforcement programme is structural. Regulators are not only pursuing the firm at the centre of an alleged fraud. They are working outward through the custody and banking chain, holding each participant to account for its own failures. For operators who outsource any part of the client asset safeguarding function, the question is no longer whether the custodian is reputable. It is whether the custodian acts on what it knows.



