What the £105.5m settlement covers
The claim was filed in 2022 by Alvarez & Marsal, the administrators appointed to NMC Health after the company entered administration in April 2020. It alleged that EY breached its contract and duty of care and was negligent in its auditing of NMC between 2012 and 2018, according to a progress report published by Alvarez & Marsal, as first reported by City AM.
The case went to a 15-week trial before Dame Clare Moulder beginning in May 2025. Before judgment was handed down, EY confirmed in February 2026 that it had reached a confidential agreement with NMC's administrators. The firm made no admission of liability.
"Health has resolved the claim it brought against its former statutory auditor, Ernst & Young LLP. The claim has been resolved without admission of liability. The settlement agreement and its terms otherwise remain confidential," an Alvarez & Marsal spokesperson said, according to City AM.
At £105.5m, the settlement represents roughly 5p on the pound of the £2bn originally sought. That ratio is not unusual in professional-negligence litigation, where the gap between the headline claim and the recoverable loss is often wide. But it is a meaningful sum for creditors of an insolvent estate, and it illustrates that administrators can extract real value from audit-related claims even without a court ruling.
EY had previously stated that it "denies the claim in its entirety," according to City AM. The settlement does not alter that position.
The NMC fraud: a brief timeline for boards
NMC Health was a major private healthcare provider and pharmaceutical distributor headquartered in Abu Dhabi. At its peak in August 2018, the company carried a market capitalisation of £8.6bn, according to City AM.
The unravelling began in late 2019 when Muddy Waters Research, a US short-seller, published a report raising concerns over NMC's accounting and governance. The company's share price fell sharply. By the time NMC was delisted in February 2020, its market value had dropped to approximately £2bn, according to City AM.
Alvarez & Marsal were appointed as administrators in April 2020. Their investigation, alongside one conducted by the Financial Conduct Authority, revealed that NMC had been operating two separate sets of accounting records. The publicly disclosed statements understated debt by $4bn, according to the FCA's findings published in 2023.
The FCA reprimanded NMC in 2023, concluding that the company had published a series of "materially inaccurate" announcements about its financial position that "misled investors," according to City AM's reporting of the FCA's statement.
The scale of the fraud placed NMC among the largest corporate collapses in the history of the London Stock Exchange. For boards, the timeline is instructive: the gap between the short-seller's initial report and the company's entry into administration was barely five months.
What the payout signals about auditor liability
The settlement figure, while substantial in absolute terms, highlights several structural realities about auditor accountability that boards and finance directors should understand.
The economics of professional-negligence claims
Pursuing a Big Four firm through the courts is expensive and slow. The NMC claim took four years from filing to settlement, including a 15-week trial. Litigation of this complexity typically runs to tens of millions of pounds in legal costs alone. For an insolvent estate, the decision to litigate is itself a commercial judgment: administrators must weigh the potential recovery against the cost and the risk of losing.
The 5p-on-the-pound outcome reflects that calculus. Settling before judgment removed the binary risk of a court ruling that could have awarded nothing, or could have awarded substantially more. Both sides had reasons to prefer certainty.
Provisions and deterrence
EY's legal provisions reportedly increased by 300 per cent as audit-related litigation mounted, according to City AM. That figure suggests the NMC claim was not an isolated exposure but part of a broader pattern of legal risk across the firm's audit practice.
For the wider Big Four sector, the settlement lands at a moment of sustained regulatory pressure. The Financial Reporting Council's audit-quality agenda continues to tighten expectations around professional scepticism and the detection of fraud. Proposed audit reform legislation, while delayed, remains on the government's agenda. Each settlement of this kind reinforces the message that audit failures carry a financial cost, even when liability is not admitted.
The "no admission" question
Settlements without admission of liability are standard in professional-negligence disputes. They allow the defendant to close the file without creating precedent that could be used against it in future claims. For creditors, the absence of an admission is immaterial; what matters is the cash recovered for the estate.
However, the lack of a judgment means there is no public finding on the specific audit failures alleged. Boards looking for guidance on what went wrong in the NMC audit will find more detail in the FCA's 2023 reprimand than in the settlement itself.
Lessons for operators appointing and overseeing auditors
The NMC case offers several practical takeaways for boards and audit committees.
Audit is not a guarantee against fraud. Even a Big Four audit conducted over six consecutive years did not detect, or did not report, a $4bn discrepancy in NMC's debt. Boards that treat the external audit as a comprehensive fraud-detection mechanism are misunderstanding its scope and limitations.
Short-seller reports deserve serious attention. The NMC fraud was surfaced not by the auditor or the regulator but by Muddy Waters Research. Boards should have processes to evaluate and respond to external challenges to their financial reporting, rather than dismissing them as hostile.
Administrators can and do pursue auditors. The Alvarez & Marsal claim demonstrates that insolvency practitioners view audit-negligence claims as a viable route to recovering value for creditors. Directors of companies in financial distress should be aware that their choice of auditor, and the quality of the audit, may be scrutinised long after they have left the board.
The cost of litigation is a factor in settlement outcomes. The gap between the £2bn claimed and the £105.5m recovered is partly a function of litigation economics. Professional-negligence claims are resource-intensive, and the outcome is never certain. Boards considering whether to pursue such claims, whether directly or through administrators, should model realistic recovery scenarios rather than headline figures.
Regulatory reform is not yet in force. Despite years of discussion, the UK has not yet legislated the audit reforms recommended by successive reviews. Until it does, the accountability framework for auditors remains largely unchanged. Boards should not assume that forthcoming regulation will retrospectively address current audit deficiencies.
The NMC settlement closes one chapter of a complex fraud story. For the creditors of the insolvent estate, £105.5m is a tangible, if partial, recovery. For the audit profession, it is another data point in a growing body of evidence that negligence claims carry real financial consequences, even when they end without a finding of fault.



